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Introduction
An exploration of issues of governance through the changing process of urban
renewal allows us to chart the changing patterns of co-operation and dialogue between
different actor groups over time. Regeneration allows distinct and specific issues of
urban governance to come to the fore, which would otherwise be lost if looking at a
city as if it were ‘stopped.’ Indeed, some have argued that the study of regeneration
projects allow the viewer to see the development of urban governance speeded up as
if through time lag technology (Kubler, 2004). The process from incubation to
regeneration through to completion can take only ten to fifteen years, providing the
observer with a short time period and a defined area to explore. Likewise, a
regeneration project facilitates close examination of the make-up of and the
interaction between actor groups such as metropolitan elites, community organisations
and national organisations in a sometimes fast moving and complex environment.
This chapter is a study of the regeneration of the Temple Bar area of Dublin. Through
this case study, the chapter explores innovative patterns of governance in Ireland’s
principal city, through the process of the regeneration of one of its most distinct areas.
This changing pattern of governance is highlighted through a period of urban
regeneration in the 1990s in Dublin. During this period, the capital city of Dublin
witnessed a huge expansion in the level of infrastructure, including office complexes,
tourism and leisure facilities and residential areas. Some of Dublin’s most derelict and
crime-ridden inner-city areas have been rejuvenated and regenerated as flourishing
focal points for tourism, housing and business activities. This chapter seeks to explore
the political dimension – and issues of democratic governance, or lack thereof –
surrounding this process.2
This chapter highlights a number of key findings from our research on the
regeneration of the Temple Bar area of Dublin. Our analysis shows the unwillingness
in Irish central public administration to transfer any major responsibility to the sub-
national level, even for political decisions and policy initiatives in the area of local
development and urban regeneration. While there has been some expansion in the role
and responsibilities of local government and its’ elected and appointed officials, there
is a much stronger tendency toward agency proliferation and ad hoc institution
building. This type of policy response, while flexible and responsive, has tended to
enhance the influence of Irish central administration rather than strengthen local
democratic capacity and responsibility.
Any inner-city urban regeneration project requires strong policy co-ordination across
different administrative domains. In the nineties, the tendency was for Irish
government departments to regard their work as autonomous of each other and take a
sector-oriented view towards to policy making. All the more remarkable then our
research finding that the Department of the Taoiseach, played a central role in pulling
together the various interests from across the relevant government departments in
order to push the Temple Bar regeneration project forward.
The research demonstrates well how quickly and astutely political ‘grassroots’ actors,
the local residents, can learn which actors are likely to be most powerful and perhaps
more importantly, which actors are likely to be ineffective in the political process. In
this research we also see the importance of informal network ties between actors in
the political process. Network ties such as those based on collegiality and friendships,
can provide the opportunity for efficient access to political influence through more3
informal channels, rather than taking the tardier route to political influence through
formal institutional representation.
Regenerating Temple Bar
This research examines metropolitan governance, Irish style, through the lens of
urban renewal policy in inner city Dublin. In particular, this chapter explores the
regeneration of Temple Bar, Dublin’s much vaunted “cultural quarter.” Regeneration
projects have been undertaken in other Irish cities, but a Dublin-based regeneration
project can provide interesting factors not seen elsewhere. Like many European
countries, Ireland’s capital city is its largest and most complex. As some Scandinavian
case studies have shown, capital cities often provide especially interesting examples
of innovative forms of urban governance, especially in smaller states which are
dominated by their capital, or where that capital city has experienced large-scale
speedy economic growth and immigration (Hansen, 2004). Like many fast-growing
European cities, Dublin has experienced changes in its local government, not least in
matters of planning and regeneration, where many actors are forced to play “catch-
up” in regarding their role in such matters.
Many actors involved in planning and local government in the city have looked to
Temple Bar as one of Dublin’s most significant and interesting renewal projects.
Previously completed regeneration projects, such as Dublin Corporation buildings on
Wood Quay, had usually involved the large-scale destruction of the existing
architecture and the building of completely new buildings – as well as being
important in terms of regeneration, Temple Bar was arguably one of Dublin’s most
important restoration projects. It was also on a scale much larger than previous4
renewal projects – 28 acres of dense buildings in the heart of the city centre including
sites of Viking archaeology as well as other sites of historical importance.
More importantly, the Temple Bar project has been hailed as a turning point in the
city government’s attitude towards regeneration. Rather than retrospective repairs of
buildings as they become derelict, the process of Temple Bar’s regeneration saw the
Council become more pro-active and planning for future regeneration. There was also
a cultural aspect to regeneration. Temple Bar became Dublin’s cultural quarter, with
pedestrianised streets, street theatre and pavement cafes. One senior architect involved
in the plans believed that Temple Bar began the process of “re-Europeanisation” of
the city centre after the decline of its Georgian heyday.
A body of literature is emerging on Irish urban planning, driven not least by
discussions on Ireland’s recent economic boom, the so-called Celtic Tiger period
which took off in the late 1990s, as well as the publication of various scandals
regarding matters of corruption which occurred in some planning issues. The Irish
Times newspaper journalist Frank McDonald has written a number of books on issues
of local area and urban regeneration as well as environmental protection (1985, 1989,
2000, 2005). A common theme across these books is specifically the destruction and
the rebuilding of Dublin, from an architectural and environmental aspect. The
Destruction of Dublin (1985) was written in the “bleak period of the mid- to late-
1980s” while his second book, The Construction of Dublin (2000) “was written in the
midst of a maelstrom of activity generated by Ireland’s booming
economy.”(McDonald, p.7, 2000). In terms of Dublin regeneration projects, a handful
of scholarly work is appearing. See, for example, the work of McGuirk, especially
Power and policy networks in Urban Governance: Local government and property5
led speculation in Dublin (2000) and Changing approaches to Urban Planning in an
“entrepreneurial city”: The Case of Dublin (2001). For the most part, existing
research findings have described or mapped out the types of involvement that
different types of political actors have in the policy process around the urban renewal
of the Dublin area (Marshall, 2002). In our research, the emphasis is on
understanding how and why these particular mechanisms of governance have evolved
over time and how they operate so as to successfully co-ordinate the actions of a
range of very different policy actors in the urban renewal policy process.
The analytical framework for this study
In seeking to understand the process of regeneration of Temple Bar and to fully
explore the issues of metropolitan governance contained therein, the different
successive phases of development will be explored in turn. Our research, like that of
others, which have charted movements in urban governance, has split the regeneration
process into three periods: The first is the initial start-up period where actors are
gathered and motivated (Kuhlmann, 2004). Secondly, the formalisation period where
legislation or public policy sets out the aims and the scope of regeneration. Thirdly,
the implementation phase where responsibilities are given and a longer-term post-
regeneration outlook are taken (Blatter, 2004). In this research, we identify and
explain the evolution of the governance structure for the regeneration of Temple Bar
within the broader changing political and social context. As this chapter shows, the
governmental context within which the Temple Bar project began its first phase of
regeneration was different from the post-Celtic Tiger city in which the restored
Temple Bar began to flourish?6
By the time this research was being conducted, Temple Bar is very well established
and flourishing as a major commercial and cultural area of Dublin city. Examining the
Temple Bar project at this stage allowed us to raise some conclusions about the
innovative form of urban governance, which it has experienced through the process of
its renewal. In 2003, Temple Bar Properties commissioned a study to examine the
regeneration of the area in the dozen years since the formal legislation (i.e. Temple
Bar Area Renewal and Development Act, 1991) was passed. In doing so, it noted that
Temple Bar now needed to reflect on which aspects of its regeneration had been
successful, which had not and how different bodies could work to rectify failures and
continue success. It also called for stakeholders to be identified and the
responsibilities they should have to be listed. In doing so, Howley-Harrington, a team
of Dublin-based architects, undertook a large-scale consultation process, finding out
from various actors as well as citizen groups what they thought of the governance of
Temple Bar and how it could be improved. Thus, by 2004 and the publication of the
report, Temple Bar had been regenerated and the patterns of its governance for the
next decade had been outlined.
Institutional and Network Embeddedness in policy making
Public policy making in Ireland and particularly those concerned with local
development initiatives involves a range of different interested actors in a
multileveled network. Finding a way to co-ordinate and build collaboration across
these different policy interests poses a real challenge, the so-called collective action
problem. An institutionalist perspective provides a useful middle range theory that
highlights the importance of institutions in framing and structuring processes of
public policy making (Hall and Taylor, 1996; March and Olsen, 1997; Akkerman and
Torenvlied, 2001). Sociolological theory suggests that institutions can reduce the7
uncertainty attached with public policy making, particularly where new policy actions
are being initiated and where the future benefits are uncertain (Millar, 2003, Mule,
1999). These institutions are best viewed as multidimensional – consisting of formal
and informal attributes (Raub, 1997). The dimensions of institutions of relevance to
this study are formal organisational structures, contractual based agreements and
established rules for managing the urban renewal measures implemented in Ireland.
The informal dimensions encompass social norms, values and customs that influence
the way things are done and how the policy process is handled. Also of relevance to
this study is how embedded actors are in their policy network as previous work
suggests that networks have effects on cooperation through mechanisms, such as the
dispersion of information about the credibility of actors and informal sanctioning
mechanisms (Raub 1997).
Over the nineties in Ireland, there has been a proliferation of public/private,
partnership-based local development initiatives, often funded under the EU Structural
Funds, which have led some authors to suggest “these developments in Irish sub-
national governance might be construed as evidence of a move away from governance
as hierarchies to new forms of network governance” (Adshead, 2003). This new
'network governance' in Ireland is often described as ‘bottom-up’, flexible, consensus
based with an ad-hoc and open membership involving multiple agencies and multi-
leveled. In this study it is argued that while the flexibility allowed by network
governance often might lead to very productive arrangements, network governance
can also lead to conservatism as well as to openness to innovations. Therefore this
research identifies the type of network characteristics of the relationships between the
actors involved in the policy process. This network analysis is useful as it can help us
understand how the position of the actor in the network may act as a resource or a8
constraint on the actor reaching his or her goals in the policy process (Dowding,
1995).
Broad institutional framework and case study methodology
Ireland’s highly centralised and sector-oriented system of policy making is closely
modelled on the British structure of public administration, under which key decisions
affecting the type of urban regeneration projects are adopted and the financial and
policy implementation are all taken at the central government level. Local government
in Ireland consists of a number of local and regional authorities at three levels. These
are: at county/city level: thirty-four local authorities are the mainline providers of local
government services - twenty-nine county councils and five cities; at sub-county
level: eighty town authorities carry out a representational role for the town with a
varying range of local government functions; at regional level: eight regional
authorities co-ordinate some of the county/city and sub-county activities; they play a
monitoring role in relation to the use of EU structural funds; two regional authorities,
known as Regional Assemblies, were established in July 1999 under new structures
for regional development. Executive decision-making and day-to-day management of
local government is the responsibility of the city or county manager, who is directly
appointed by the Minister for Environment and Local Government. The City and
County Councils, comprising publicly elected representatives or ‘county councillors’
as they are generally referred to, have very limited decision-making powers. They
have “reserve powers” which implies that under some exceptions they may act to
amend the county or city development plan.
The most striking characteristic of the Irish public policy system is the persistent
tendency to establish a single function state body that is first answerable to the9
central state authorities and often to a particular government department (NESC,
1979; Marshall, 2002). In the absence of functioning sub-national local and regional
authorities, many semi-state bodies and public bodies had regional levels of organi-
sation. At this level of organisation, one finds the ad-hoc growth of single function
agencies and offices – quangos – arising mainly from decentralisation of government
departments and state agencies and operating as autonomous actors and independent
of each other. Coyle and Sinnott point to "a proliferation of regional bodies operating in
differently constituted sets of regions" (1993, p.79). More often than not, the boundaries
of the territorial areas for which these different statutory bodies have responsibility, do
not coincide with one another. Over the nineties, very substantial funding and impetus
was given by the European Commission for local development and urban renewal
initiatives in Ireland, including the Temple Bar project (Payne, 1999; 2000). Whilst
by-passing local and regional authorities in Ireland, working partnerships have been
formed instead between Ireland’s central government ‘lead’ departments, these arm’s
length agencies or quangos, the social partners, including business interests, trade
unions and farmers, and micro-level groups at the community level, thereby satisfying
the Commission’s demand for broad participation and consultation.
The case study methodology for this research
This study was conducted using an extensive and in-depth analysis of relevant public
documents and existing research on urban renewal, including spatial planning, and
with particular reference to the urban area of interest. Semi-structured interviews were
undertaken with a wide range of senior officials from public and private
organisations, who were involved in the regeneration of Temple Bar. As outlined
earlier, in examining this regeneration case study, we identified a number of phases of
development, ranging from a start-up phase through to an implementation phase. The10
policy network of actors involved in each of the phases and for each case study was
identified and measured (Akkerman & Torenvlied, 2001). A non-technical overview
of these network findings for each of the case studies is presented in this paper. We
also sought to identify the types of formal institutional arrangements in place and
emergent during each of these phases of development.
The Temple Bar case study
The Temple Bar case study is the story of the renovation and development of a mostly
derelict twenty–eight acres site, situated in the inner city of Dublin on the south bank
of the River Liffey. Composed of Georgian brick buildings, and cobbled streets,
Temple Bar is one of the oldest parts of the city. Originally it was earmarked for
demolition to be the site of Dublin’s proposed central bus depot. Buildings were
rented out on short-term leases at low rent, attracting independent clothes and music
shops. Over time, Temple Bar became known as Dublin’s bohemian quarter. By the
mid-1980s the proposal for a bus depot had become more unlikely and tentative steps
were taken by the tenants of the area to preserve the unique nature of Temple Bar as
Dublin’s cultural quarter. From that point, regeneration gathered more actor groups
and both the fabric and the purpose of the buildings were changed, and improved.
Network and Institutionalist Embeddedness
Phase 1 (1965-1989)
The chapter traces the development of Temple Bar through the three phases sketched
in the table below. In doing so, it notes the critical junctures, or the points at which the
patterns of co-operation in the governance of regeneration shifted.11
Table 1. Phases and Key Events for Temple Bar
Phase
Phases of Development and Key Events
Phase 1: Start up
(1965-1989)
1965: Transportation in Dublin document
1976: Skidmore, Owens and Merrill Report proposes Temple Bar as CIE depot
1986: Temple Bar – A Policy for the Future, published by An Taisce
1989: Temple Bar Development Council is established;





1990: Department of the Taoiseach and the Temple Bar Development Council
prepares a proposal for EU funding of Urban Pilot Projects.
1991: Dublin City Council’s Temple Bar Area Action Plan included in Dublin City
Development Plan, 1991.
The Finance Act, 1991




1992: Temple Bar Properties Ltd. publish Development Programme for Temple
Bar
1994: EU Structural Funds Operational Programme for Local Urban and Rural
Development – Sub Programme 3, Measure 5
2000: Development of Cultural Centres completed with the opening of the
Project
2003: Harrington Report recommendations.
The following sections do not aim to tell the story of Temple Bar, but rather they
outline the network and institutionalist embeddedness of the regeneration project, as
described earlier. Ireland's heavily centralised political system and administration
identifies the central government departments responsible for the proper auditing and
management of12
programmes and policy. In the absence of either trusted informal, network type
mechanisms or formal mechanisms of co-ordination, there is always a chance that
'other actors' will strongly deviate from the policy recommendation of the central
departments. These central government departments must have the guarantee that
other actors with whom they collaborate at the implementation phase and will stick to
the agreed programme of policy measures. Central government actors will overtly
regard credibility as an extremely important attribute, in determining trustworthy
partners in the networks for policy decision-making and subsequent policy
implementation. Given the lack of real involvement afforded to the Irish local
authorities by central government at the planning and decision making phases (phases
1 and 2), it is perhaps unsurprising difficulties arise at the implementation phase
regarding compliance in planning and execution (Torenvlied, 2000).
By 1976, the national Bus and Rail Company, Córas Iompair Éireann (CIE) had
moved squarely behind the proposal to locate the central depot in the Temple Bar
area. CIE began acquiring property in the area and leasing buildings at low rent to
artists, retailers, etc. CIE were unwilling to invest in the upkeep of the fabric of the
buildings so it was the tenants and residents of Temple Bar themselves who initiated
the process of redevelopment in the late 1970s about the future of the area. The most
important development during the start-up phase (i.e. phase 1) was the establishment
of the Temple Bar Development Council (TBDC), which represented the local, small-
scale business and cultural interests and residents living in the area. In terms of the
structure of the relationships between the various interests, the TBDC actor became
the focal point (i.e. high centrality) of communication and influence in policy
network, particularly during this first phase of the regeneration of the Temple Bar
area. Many of the initial actors knew each other because of their involvement with13
local art projects, but as one participant noted, it was unusual to work as allies rather
than competitors for funding. Managers of art projects were unused to sharing their
time and staff with other bodies, and the culture of co-operation was difficult to create
outside the inner circle of enthusiasts. Great effort was made to draw in local residents
and businesses, and maintain internal unity when producing public statements.
The effect of the highly centralised Irish political system is seen in the way in which
the local actors such as Temple Bar Development Council and Dublin City Council
interacted with each other in the first phase of the Temple Bar project. The Temple
Bar Development Council produced a document with several proposals for the
regeneration of the Temple Bar area. These proposals were deliberately submitted to
various bodies ranging from national to city level. This was because the TBDC
quickly recognised that it was important to engage key actors at the national central
level of government, in the hope that this would put downward pressure from national
government onto the City Council. The TBDC had also approached the Dublin City
Council to look for assistance, financial and other, for their proposal for the
regeneration of the Temple Bar area. In the research interviews, which were
conducted with the senior officials from Dublin City Council (then known as Dublin
Corporation), it was indicated that at this early stage the City Council had no cohesive
over-arching development plan for Dublin, nor did it have the finances to undertake
one. For example, the suggestion that the TBDC approach the central government
Department of Finance came from Dublin City Council itself, who were unable to
make financial provisions of that level and to raise the public profile of the whole
proposal.14
During the first phase of Temple Bar regeneration project, the active policy network
comprised mainly local sub-national actors including relevant departments of Dublin
City Council, with the EU Commission and the Department of an Taoiseach involved
only the periphery of the network. However during the later part of 1988, the policy
network began to change as personal contacts and friendships facilitated informal
contact between the Temple Bar Development Council and Paddy Teahon, the
dynamic and influential General Secretary of the Department of an Taoiseach, Charles
Haughey. His access to the Taoiseach allowed the Temple Bar residents to by-pass the
normal formal and time consuming political ladder and instead to have access to the
heart of government.
Phase 2 (1990 – 1991)
In the second phase of the project, there is a remarkable change in the composition
and structure of the policy network. A number of new actors joined the network,
which primarily included several central government departments and semi state
agencies such as the national Tourism Board, Bord Failte. These were vital actors as
they were able to give professional advice and credibility to the voluntary and self-
confessed amateurs within TBDC. Moreover the most central actor in the network
became the Department of the Taoiseach. The Taoiseach was in a position to pluck
“pet projects” from the pool of schemes for his own attention. One actor involved in
the plans believed that the Taoiseach, Charles Haughey, saw Temple Bar as a visible
cultural initiative in which he could promote himself as a statesman in the dying days
of his premiership.15
In a conference on the future of Dublin’s infrastructure and fabric, Haughey noted:
“Temple Bar is one of the most important, traditional, attractive and noteworthy parts
of the city, and it has to be refurbished and kept, and I won’t let CIÉ near it.”
1In order
to motivate other residents, and to demonstrate the commitment of the Taoiseach,
Temple Bar activists repeated Haughey’s words, almost as a mantra.
Once the Temple Bar project is taken on board as a key area of responsibility of the
Department of the Taoiseach, the administrative, financial and political resources
effectively become available to the TBDC. The Taoiseach's Department worked
directly with TBDC and Dublin City Council to submit a proposal for funding under
the EU Urban Pilot Project programme and this proposal was ultimately successful.
More notable perhaps, was the speed and relative ease with which the subsequent
legislation was passed in 1991 to establish the new institutional structure or quango to
manage the development of the Temple Bar area into the future.. Temple Bar
Renewal Ltd. was set up with the remit to approve development proposals to enable
them to avail of the incentives provided for in Chapter VII of the Finance Act, 1991.
The Temple Bar Properties Ltd. is the Development Company for the Temple Bar
Area, so designated under the Temple Bar Area Renewal and Development Act, 1991.
The establishment of these two new companies provided the organisational and
management framework to give form and focus to the renewal process (Montgomery
1995). In order to keep the momentum of progress, legislation was introduced on the
last day of the sitting of Dáil Eireann, rather than wait until after the summer recess.
In such moments, support of the national government came into its own. It is also
useful to note that some of the key individuals involved in the original Temple Bar
Development Council also subsequently took management responsibilities within
1 Charles Haughey, Dublin Crisis Conference, Dublin, February 1987, quoted in “Temple Bar
Development Council’s Submission to Dublin Corporation Planning Department” April 198816
Temple Bar Properties, and over a decade since the legislation was passed, continued
to do so.
In the second phase of this project's development, again we see the impact of the
centralised political system in Ireland and in this case, the major role of the
Department of the Taoiseach. Over the course of the first (1989-1993) and second
(1994-1999) rounds of Structural Funds for Ireland, Temple Bar attracted some
IR£40.6m (€51.55m) in EU and State funding, of which IR£22.1m (€28.06m) came
directly from the European Regional Development Fund. Despite the European
Commission’s strong desire for subsidiarity – policy-making and implementation at
the lowest possible level – the Temple Bar project was managed in a way wholly
consistent with the centralised Irish approach to governance (Marshall, 2002). A key
principle of the Reform of the Structural Funds legislation was the call for multilevel
partnerships involving the public and private actors, at the relevant local, regional and
central levels of administration within the member state. However, the lead
department, in the case of Temple Bar, was that of the Department of the Taoiseach
which implemented partnership and subsidiarity on its own terms, creating a brand-
new State body, Temple Bar Properties Ltd., to serve as an implementing authority
with the participation of local-level actors and the social partners. The development of
Temple Bar remained a project under the auspices of the Department of the
Taoiseach, up until 1993, when there was a general re-organisation of government
departments. Responsibility for the Temple Bar project was then shifted to the
Department of the Environment, a body better suited to overseeing the
implementation of the project, following its incubation period in the Department of
the Taoiseach. Throughout this time, the partnership between the local community in17
Temple Bar and central and sectoral oriented government departments, particularly
the Department of the Taoiseach, remained strong.
Whatever way we judge the Temple Bar project, the impact of the legislation
introduced in 1991 is clear: it gave a new dynamic to the regeneration project and
created new working patterns amongst the key partners to the process. However one
key actor who remained unsatisfied with the process was the Dublin City Council,
formally known as Dublin Corporation. Within Dublin City Council there is a deep
sense of grievance that it has been effectively sidelined in terms of the executive
decision making regarding the development of the Temple Bar area. Marshall has
suggested that while “Dublin Corporation was included on both of Temple Bar’s
management committees”… “day-to-day executive decisions remained the province
of Temple Bar Properties, the city’s elected government played a comparatively
minor role in the formulation of redevelopment policy. The Corporation’s only
leverage over the Temple Bar project was in planning approvals; unlike the
Docklands, Temple Bar was not designated an independent planning area” (2002. Our
research interviews with senior officials within the Dublin City Council indicated that
during the nineties, considerable organisational change took place within Dublin City
Council and that it increased its internal capacity for strategic planning and
development as well as its ability to take on large-scale regeneration projects.
However, in the late eighties and early nineties, this level of capacity and perhaps
organisational confidence was lacking within the Dublin Corporation.
In 1991, an architectural competition was launched to restore many of the Georgian
buildings which give Temple Bar its character, and which were now crumbling.
During the 1980s a group of former Architecture students in Dublin began18
undertaking small commissions on a partnership basis. By 1991, these architects,
despite working in different practices around the city, came together to put in a joint
bid for the contract of restoring Temple Bar architecturally, under the name Group 91.
Thus within the teams of architects involved in the restoration of Temple Bar, we can
see a smaller network taking place. By awarding the contract to a group of likeminded
architects, both they and Temple Bar Properties felt comfortable that every group
would produce plans basically similar in outlook. Working with friends and
colleagues which they had known for nearly twenty years, the architects believed that
they has a supportive environment in which to create, with the added benefit of small
rivalries, which they knew would not escalate and threaten the projects. Once again,
the relative smallness of the city had a direct impact on the look of the fabric of the
buildings, and the absence of Dublin City Council’s own architects is striking.
Phase 3 (1992 – 2014)
The speed at which the second phase moves into the third, largely post regeneration,
phase has been seen by some as testimony to the involvement of the Taoiseach and
the success in attracting European funding. Indeed, there can be seen something of a
virtuous circle – public support by the Taoiseach leading to successful funding bids,
which in turn raises the profile of the project, thus attracting further governmental
support. Of all the ministerial support that Temple Bar Development Council could
have hoped for, that of the Taoiseach was the most welcome. His support for the
project shaved years off the project, revealed hitherto hidden pools of financial
support and facilitated access to experts. Having the architectural framework in place
following Group ‘91’s winning of the competition meant that planning applications
could be now made. This put the regeneration of Temple Bar firmly in the sight of the
city’s residents. Full-page newspaper advertisements were taken out describing the19
buildings, which would be restored. The architectural framework devised by Group
’91 has subsequently been described as “brilliant” (Howley Harrington Architects,
2004) and the manner in which it was presented to the public – as a realistic but large-
scale restoration project, not creating office blocks, but creating some thing for them –
meant that the feedback from the public was largely supportive.
In 1992, the regeneration of Temple Bar turned its second corner. Legislation had
been passed and the second part of Temple Bar – the West End – was earmarked for
further regeneration into a mixed-use development of accommodation and housing.
The cultural programmes, meanwhile, were secured with further European and
domestic exchequer funding. The improved economy, coupled with the first cheap
flights from the United Kingdom and Europe, brought tourists and money into the
area, making it an attractive location in which to open a business and raised its profile
as a holiday destination.
In 1993, the support of the regeneration project moved from the Department of the
Taoiseach to the Department of Environment, and the Minister for the Environment
became the sole shareholder of Temple Bar Properties. In 2001, once the fabric of
regeneration had been completed, the shareholder again moved, this time to the
Dublin City Council. In each move, many feared that the project would be lost within
the sea of departmental responsibilities as it competed with other projects and
responsibilities for ministerial attention, but the steady networking between grassroots
activists and the government bodies ensured that this was not the case, and that
Temple Bar received full attention. Grassroots actors became formalised in this
period, forming Traders in the Area Supporting the Cultural Quarter Limited (TASCQ20
ltd.). TASCQ members include the pubs, restaurants and shops in the area. In return
for a financial contribution, these businesses are promoted by Temple Bar Properties.
This changed with the advent of the third period of regeneration in Temple Bar. In
2003, TASCQ and Temple Bar Properties commissioned a future framework plan for
the area. The last large-scale development plan for the area had been in 1993, with
Temple Bar’s Development Plan. Since then, Temple Bar had changed, and it was felt
that a consultation exercise amongst actor groups and the production of a definitive
and detailed plan for the next decade of the area was needed, to put the development
back on track. In the completed report issued in 2004, the architectural firm
commissioned with the report noted: “It is about ten years since the ‘new’ Temple Bar
was born and is now about time to assess a way forward for the next decade. Every
city centre is in a constant state of change and flux, not least Temple Bar” (Howley
Harrington Architects, 2004). By 2003, the regeneration of the main part of Temple
Bar was complete, the buildings were all occupied and the West End development had
recently been completed. A decade after legislation was introduced, its most major
flaw was clearly discernable – the large number of “super pubs” which had been listed
as a cultural service in the 1991 legislation and to whom it was difficult to refuse
planning permission. Indeed, the excessive amounts of alcohol available in Temple
Bar has meant “Temple Bar has become more renowned for its drinking than anything
else” rather than for the cultural events (Howley Harrington Architects, 2004). The
2004 Plan aimed to redress the balance away from Temple Bar (“The temple of bars”)
to the cultural quarter, which would open up the area to more people than those on
stag weekends or an extended pub-crawl. A responsibility for the cleanliness and the
character of the area was given to the traders, through the auspices of TASCQ, but
there was clearly a role for the City Council, not just in street lighting and street21
cleaning, but also in the training and supervision of door staff and the investigation of
breaches of planning laws in the area.
More importantly, by 2003, the role of the City Council had changed, as well as the
attitude of the Temple Bar authorities towards it. The 2004 Urban Framework Plan
listed the City Council as a major stakeholder in Temple Bar, having a strong role to
play in the further development of the area. There had traditionally been an
ambiguous relationship between Temple Bar and the City Council, characterised by
an unwillingness to get involved, and then a readiness to undertake some small
actions when pressurised from the national government or from Temple Bar activists.
In the 2004 Framework Plan, the City Council had become a needed and welcome
stakeholder in the continued development of the plan, and many within the Council
were pleased, at last to do so.
Conclusion: metropolitan governance in Ireland
Our empirical research has spanned a critical time period in the urban regeneration of
Dublin’s inner city. From the case study presented, it is clear that the formal and
informal institutions of Ireland’s centralised government remain deeply rooted and
powerful. While recognising the innovative character of partnership based policy co-
ordination, this research also points to the important underlying governance
mechanisms at work which primarily depend on central government departments
initiating or directly engaging with micro level community actors and social partners
in the early stages of a local development initiative. Moreover over the 1990s there
was a significant increase in the capacity of central government departments to
effectively engage directly with local level actors and social partners more generally,
often for the purposes of managing EU funds (Payne, 1999). With regard to the EU22
Structural funded urban projects, such as Temple Bar, the central government sectoral
department established a separate body to manage the structural funded urban
projects, rather than go through the existing local authority structures and the elected
base of local representatives. For some commentators, the new institutional structures
created such as Temple Bar Properties are seen in a negative light. Marshall argues
that “the creation of a special regime for Temple Bar further eroded the power of
existing local authorities” (Marshall, 2002). For others, such as Montgomery (1995),
“the government was careful and very sure to keep Dublin City Council at arm’s
length from the whole initiative…the effect has been to free the area from the dead
hand of bureaucracy”, thereby ensuring efficient implementation and progress (in
Marshall 2002). Russell suggests that “local authorities acted as facilitators and
enablers of private sector development, rather than as the key drivers or implementing
agencies of urban renewal (Russell, 2001). Certainly these contrasting critiques go to
the heart of the debate about the principle of local democratic participation and
representation in this emergent Irish urban governance model. Moreover, this issue
becomes more relevant when it is noted that the Temple Bar governance structure was
later replicated throughout the Dublin area as additional European funds were directed
to urban initiatives.
The story of evolving governance patterns in Dublin is also one of growing and
persistent calls for greater representation in the policy process. While this call has
been echoed across the Irish political system, in particular, public and private actors at
sub-national level have become more aware and confident in their own potential
contribution to the policy process. Moreover the impact of the various EU financed
initiatives directly targeting local communities has allowed new actors to enter the
policy networks, which have traditionally been centralist and hierarchical. Marshall23
suggests that “grass-roots actors, accustomed to a place at the table following a
decade of EU-mandated partnership arrangements, show no intention of withdrawing
from the urban policy process despite the progressive wind-down of EU funding for
Dublin city-region” (2001). The ad-hoc approach to partnership governance in Ireland
has led to a kind of confusion about the distinction between participative and
representative democracy. Often this has resulted in the pursuit of partnership led
governance for its own sake, with little attention paid to who is representing who, on
what basis and with what capacity to do so. This research points to the general lack of
trust, which characterises local level relationships between the local public elected
representatives and the local private sector and community interests. Local urban
development initiatives are seen to be successful often in spite of local government,
which has usually felt threatened and sidelined by these activities.
The introduction of the various local government reforms from the mid-1990s
onwards promises a stronger co-ordinating role for democratically elected local
government in Ireland. Moreover, these reforms also attempt to incorporate into their
model of local government the widespread demand and popularity of participatory
form of local governance. However the research findings presented here show that, by
themselves, these reforms are quite limited and do not adequately facilitate city and
county councils to engage constructively with local partners and establish a clear
advisory role or voice for the local community and social partners in local
government policy. While this move towards a more formalised approach to
partnership at the local level and within local government is welcomed by many of
those involved, the really difficult and thorny issues of enhancing the financial and
other resources, management capacity and policy remit of democratically elected
local government in Ireland remains essentially untouched. In the absence of real24
progress on this front, Ireland’s favourite response, innovative but ad-hoc, effective
but of dubious democratic credentials, the ubiquitous quango seems likely to remain
the only game in town.25
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